Contracts, Copyright, and Confusion: Revisiting the Enforceability of \u27Shrinkwrap\u27 Licenses by Heath, Steven A.
Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property 
Volume 5 Issue 1 Article 2 
9-1-2005 
Contracts, Copyright, and Confusion: Revisiting the Enforceability 
of 'Shrinkwrap' Licenses 
Steven A. Heath 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip 
 Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Steven A. Heath, Contracts, Copyright, and Confusion: Revisiting the Enforceability of 'Shrinkwrap' 
Licenses, 5 Chi. -Kent J. Intell. Prop. 12 (2005). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/ckjip/vol5/iss1/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Journal of Intellectual Property by an authorized editor of 
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact 
jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
Copyright © 2005, Chicago Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
CONTRACTS, COPYRIGHT, AND CONFUSION
REVISITING THE ENFORCEABILITY OF 'SHRINKWRAP' LICENSES
Steven A. Heath
Introduction
An air of inevitability accompanies the judicial and academic tendency of making
analogies between the Internet and the real world: "[c]omparing online stores to physical stores
and [online] agreements to paper contracts can provide a useful starting-point from which to
make sense of cyberspace."'I When Internet disputes first came before the courts, the use of
metaphor would usually be combined with a description of what the Internet actually was,
although this habit was probably more for the benefit of the judiciary than anyone else. The
Internet has been likened to highways, telephone systems, a copying machine of global
proportions, a modern reincarnation of Gutenberg's printing press, and even an ocean. 2  A
favored portrayal must surely be that of the Internet as a feudal society, complete with cyberlords
(online businesses), cybermanors (websites), cyberfiefs (payments to service providers), and the
(ever-repressed) private user, the cyberserf.
3
Nonetheless, judges were quick to uphold the value of the Internet as a medium of free
speech and a source of innovation.4 The latter point emphasizes the considerable importance of
copyright: to uphold the intellectual property rights of producers in a medium which is renowned
for facilitating the rapid, global transmission of information. While efforts by the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) to 'streamline' intellectual property
rights continue, the majority of states look to their own copyright and patent laws as the prime
source of protection for innovation. Intellectual property goods are 'public' in nature, and
characterized by nonrivalry and nonexcludability: everyone benefits from their consumption, and
my own consumption of the good does not affect that of my neighbor, yet this leads to free-
riding and subsequent under-production. 5 The solution is to "grant an author of a work a limited
statutory monopoly by conferring upon the author certain exclusive rights" 6 while, at the same
Steven A. Heath is an analyst with Kobre & Kim LLP in New York, NY; M.A., University of Chicago Committee
on International Relations, Chicago, IL; LL.B. (Hons), University of Durham, UK. He extends his thanks to
Chad J. Doellinger and Uli Widmaier, Lecturers at the University of Chicago Law School and attorneys at
Pattishall McAuliffe in Chicago, for their support and comments on earlier drafts. The views expressed in this
article are those of the author and are not purported to reflect those of Kobre & Kim LLP.
Erika S. Koster & Christopher R. Hilberg, Will It Get Quieter in Cyberspace? Trespass on the Internet, 21 No. 1
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW. 1 (2004). The authors continue: "[a]s is often the case, however, the analogy can
break down. It is not shocking to discover gaps (or, in the view of some, crevasses) when the laws being
applied to the Internet are rooted in the mid-13th century common law of England."
2 Alfred C. Yen, Western Frontier or Feudal Society?: Metaphors and Perceptions of Cyberspace, 17 BERKLEY
TECH. L.J. 1207, 1210 (2002).
3 Id. at 1213.
4 See Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997); American Civil Liberties Union v. Ashcroft, 322
F.3d 240 (3rd Cir. 2003).
5 William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326
(1989).
6 Apik Minassian, The Death of Copyright: Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licensing Agreements, 45 UCLA L. REV.
569, 589 (1997).
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time, upholding the public interest in "the free flow of information on which such creativity is
built." 7 The resulting compromise will determine the efficacy of copyright:
... a weak copyright regime would encourage cheap imitations and duplications of works.
This would increase the availability of choices to the public, but would decrease the
incentives to create new work. On the other hand, an overexpansive copyright scheme,
although it would provide a substantial reward to the current author... would
simultaneously discourage works of subsequent authors who seek to rely on the original
work.8
This paper will assess the nature of this balance with regard to the computer industry's
use of software licenses to protect its copyrightable works. The paper will consider several
issues, such as whether software licenses are valid under state contract law, and the controversy
associated with judicial recourse to the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Part I discusses the
history and rationale for the software license in the computer industry. Part II focuses on
controversies relating to the enforceability of such licenses under contract law, with
consideration of the treatment of software licenses as contracts for the sale of goods under the
UCC, and then considers the issues of federal preemption of state contract law. Part III considers
the implications of the consolidation of the licensing 'norm' in the mass market. Overall, this
paper will demonstrate that cases such as ProCD v. Zeidenberg9 and Specht v. Netscape'0 have
resulted in the consolidation of a regime where vendors enjoy levels of protection far exceeding
the traditional boundaries of copyright law.
I. The Emergence of the Software License
Software licensing arose due to the prevalence of two factors beguiling the software
industry. First, the traditional license negotiated for custom software constituted a means of
avoiding governmental scrutiny over anti-competitive practices at large in the computing
industry. Second, throughout the 1970s and 1980s the license-form itself afforded protection to
producers at a time where the precise application of copyright laws to computer programs
presented a purely "open question.""I
A. The Rationale for Shrinkwrap Licenses
The initial practice in the computer industry was for software and hardware to be
'bundled' by the vendor and distributed directly to the end user. Transactions costs were
sufficiently high to ensure that the hardware 'giants' would rarely undertake a project for clients
other than institutional elites and governments. In 1969, and following a Department of Justice
antitrust investigation into its practice of bundling, IBM separated its pricing policies for
hardware and software. Hardware became subject to leasing arrangements and software became
7 Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract: Copyright Preemption of
Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 485 (1995). Cited in Minassian, supra note 6, at 589.
8 Minassian, supra note 6, at 591.
9 86 F.3d 1447 (7 th Cir. 1996).
'0 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
" Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1239, 1242 (1995).
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subject to licenses, through which the developer retained title to the software code, with specific,
limited rights granted to the client.12
The use of such licenses also met the growing concerns that the "general functional value
of software and the utilitarian nature of its object code"'13 denied it protection under copyright
laws. While the protection of such intellectual property rights is an established global facet
today, it was only after the 1978 report of the Federal Commission on New Technological Uses
of Copyrighted Works (CONTU) that computer programmers could enjoy protection such rights
under the copyright laws. 14 CONTU's labor culminated in a series of amendments to the 1976
Copyright Act, with a definition of 'computer program' being added to §101. Furthermore, the
newly-created § 117 granted certain rights to users of copyright programs.15
It should have been clear that the amendments were intended to extend copyright
protection to computer programs, 16 yet such intent was not expressly stated. While Apple
Computer v. Franklin Computer17 did confirm the copyrightability of object code, courts debated
the proper scope of the protection afforded to computer programs by both copyright and patent
law throughout the 1980s. 18 The existing licensing custom provided an ideal solution for
software producers unnerved by judicial uncertainty:
[Vendors] created the legal fiction that they were really licensing rather than selling their
software. Because the 'license' contained provisions that required customers to keep the
software confidential, the trade secrets contained therein could be protected.
19
Admittedly this practice posed few legal problems in an era where licensing agreements
were negotiated by the developers on the one hand, and corporations and governments on the
other. However, the advent of mass-produced machines, such as the PC and the Apple Mac, saw
prices of individual transactions drop dramatically. Threatened by a flood of new entrants, the
established hardware producers responded by cutting costs, and generated innovative sales
techniques and distribution channels in the form of telesales operations, retail outlets, and
eventually, online stores.2 0 The mass marketing of software ultimately ensured that "the formal
signed software license had become incompatible with the distribution of personal computer
software ... Ease of purchase became a key component in winning the business."
2'
12 Michael J. Madison, Reconstructing the Software License, 35 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 275, 311 (2003).
13 Deanna L. Kwong, The Copyright-Contract Intersection: SofiMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems, Inc. & Bowers
v. Baystate Technologies, Inc. 18 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 349, 353 (2003).
14 Final Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1978).
1517 U.S.C. §§ 101,117 (2000).
16 Congress' intent was for computer programs to be viewed as 'literary works' embodying the programmer's own
creativity and expression.
17 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983).
See Lemley, supra note 11, at 1242-1243 (citing Computer Associates International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d
693 (2d Cir. 1992), (disagreement over whether protection of computer programs extended to nonliteral
infringement)).
19 Id. at 1244-1245.
20 Glen Germanowski, Is the 'Shrinkwrap'Licence Worth the Paper Envelope It's Printed On? 6 No. 3 INT'L J.L. &
INFO. TECH. 313,314 (1999).
21 1d. at 314.
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The industry adapted to these changes by incorporating the license within the packaging
of the purchased software. This came to be known as a 'shrinkwrap' license, by simple virtue of
the fact that it was physically included with the package's cellophane wrapping. Three initial
forms were common: the 'envelope license,' with the license printed on the exterior of a sealed
envelope containing the product (usually a CD-ROM or disk); the 'box-top' license; read before
opening a sealed box containing the product; and the 'referral license,' where the user is
informed of a license that should be read before the manufacturer's seal is broken. Being an
innovative response to changing market conditions, the shrinkwrap license has since been
refined, as symbolized by the emergence of electronic 'click-wrap' and 'browse-wrap' licenses.
22
Mass marketed software licenses thus enjoy a pedigree stretching back to at least the
early 1980s. Further, some argue that software licenses (notwithstanding their various elements
of controversy) have considerably enhanced the general efficacy of the computer industry.
Competition among hardware companies to pre-load PCs with software ensured that the recent
purchaser would discover several similar license arrangements from various producers, each
maintaining conditions of use for their particular product. 'Negotiation' for use of each software
producer's program was reduced to a sole unilateral agreement through the development of
'indirect' distribution channels, consisting of suppliers who shipped the various components as
one unit, to be marketed as a single product. 24 Thus, "if each of these indirect channels is able to
rely on the shrinkwrap" contained within the bundle (each program containing its own license),
then there would be no burden for the producer to "amalgamate terms from its own product...
with those of the software producer."
25
B. The Shrinkwrap License as an Industry 'Norm'
The shrinkwrap license emerged as a variant of the traditional software license in
response to the somewhat haphazard development of the market. The 1980 amendments to the
Copyright Act clarified that copyright does apply to computer programs. One might have
expected an associated rise in confidence in the industry, such that its early tendency "to
shoehorn software distribution into the law of trade secrets" would have disappeared along with
aforementioned uncertainties. 26  In fact, the subsequent consolidation of the license as a
marketplace norm privileged the software lobby a level of protection beyond that normally
afforded to copyrightable material. As a species of contract, the license-form influences three
areas. First, the grant of a license circumvents the Doctrine of First Sale. Second, the license
can include restrictive terms, such as prohibitions against 'Fair Use' exceptions for reverse
22 A click-wrap license takes two forms. (1) where the user must click agree to the license before downloading it
from the Internet (normally, by clicking a box stating "I Agree", situated below the terms and conditions of the
license); (2) where the license appears during the installation process for the software (to which the user must
again signify their acceptance by clicking). A browse-wrap license slightly varies in that, prior to download or
installation, the user is directed to a hyperlink containing the terms of the license which they may (or may not)
scrutinize through a 'pop-up' window.
23 David Einhorn, Comment, The Enforceability of 'Tear-Me-Open' Software Licence Agreements, 67 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 509 (1985).
24 Germanowski, supra note 20, at 314.
2 5
1Id. at 314-315.
26 Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1039
(1998).
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engineering and decompiling. Third, the license may also purport to disclaim all implied and
express warranties in the product.
The Doctrine of First Sale is embodied in § 109(a) of the Copyright Act:
The owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any
person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright
owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.
27
The shrinkwrap license circumvents this provision by stipulating that the purchaser licensee is
never elevated to the status of an owner, and may only use the software subject to specific
limitations. Generally, the license prevents the purchaser from undertaking such acts as copying,
modifying or converting the program for any purpose. 28  The licensor retains ownership,
enjoying expanded rights to the detriment of its licensee: in Microsoft v. Harmony Computer &
Electronics,29 the court held that an unauthorized distributor of software could not rely upon the
doctrine to escape a claim for infringement since Microsoft had not sold, but only licensed, the
product to the distributor's supplier. As will be discussed, the Seventh Circuit has qualified this
issue in recent years.
30
A typical license will also contain provisions protecting the software from attempts to
reverse engineer the code. Briefly, software is generally written in source code, which is legible
to both humans and machines. The source code is then processed to produce binary-sequenced
object code which can only be read by machines. By prohibiting disassembly, software
producers can be assured that the trade secrets embodied in the original source code are
protected. 31 However, such prohibitions are not generally supported in the global regime of
intellectual property. The E.C. Software Directive forbids such restrictions as a matter of
policy.32  In the U.S., some decompiling is authorized if required to make the program
compatible with the operating platform, or if reverse engineering is the only means by which the
user may unlock some of the program's noncopyrightable elements. 33  Furthermore, the
Copyright Act does not allow software producers to prohibit the making of archival or backup
copies of software where necessary.34 Finally, the shrinkwrap license will usually include some
limitation on the producer's liability to the consumer.
Overall, the value of shrinkwrap licenses to developers is beyond doubt, yet their
continued use in the modern marketplace is a source of ongoing controversy:
If enforced, such licenses provide vendors with guaranteed proprietary rights to the
information contained in the software ... Even if not enforced, shrinkwrap licenses may
27 17 U.S.C. 109(a) (2000).
28 See Lemley, supra note 11, at 1246 ("Intellectual property strikes a careful balance between the rights of
intellectual property owners and the rights of users. Vendors who draft shrinkwrap license provisions often
seek to expand their rights and limit the rights of users.")
29 846 F. Supp. 208,210 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
30 See ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 ( 7th Cir. 1996).
31 See Kwong, supra note 13, at 355-356.
32 European Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 91/250/EC.
33 See Atari Games Corp v. Nintendo ofAmerica, 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir 1992); Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992).
14 17 U.S.C. 117. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5 h Cir. 1988).
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have the practical effect of intimidating users unfamiliar with current case law into
accepting such terms.
3 5
II. The Validity of Shrinkwrap Licenses
Given that shrinkwrap licenses manipulate the rights of the producer relative to those of
the end user, it is not surprising that their general enforceability has been challenged. The case
law involving shrinkwrap licenses is sparse, instructive, and controversial. The sole legislative
initiative aimed at resolving the controversy is embodied in the Uniform Computer Information
Transactions Act (UCITA), and its predecessor, the proposed Article 2B of the UCC. UCITA
has been subject to intense criticism on the grounds that it over-privileges the powerful software
lobby. Consequently, it has been shunned by the majority of the states addressing the issue.
36
Nonetheless, as will be examined in Part IV, elements of UCITA's reasoning have crept into
recent decisions, confirming its position as a source of persuasive authority in the courts. 37 In
determining the enforceability of shrinkwrap licenses, the courts generally consider three points:
first, whether the license is acceptable to the principles of contract law; second, whether the
transfer is in fact a sale; and third, whether federal law preempts the state's contractual regime.
38
A. Software Licenses under Contract Law
Software license agreements deviate from the traditional bargain paradigm which entails
an offer and acceptance, with consideration flowing in both directions. 39  Accordingly, the
software license has been aptly described as a "reverse unilateral contract." 40 A widely-held,
albeit mistaken, belief is that the early cases discussing shrink-wrap licenses found the licenses
to be unenforceable per se. At best, such cases only confirm judicial suspicion concerning
their enforceability. In Step-Saver Data v. Wyse Technology42 and Arizona Retail Systems v. The
Software Link,4 3 the licenses at issue were found to be invalid under the UCC, which prohibits
the addition of material terms once a contract has been concluded.
In Step-Saver, the plaintiff brought a breach of warranty claim against co-defendant The
Software Link, the supplier of a shrinkwrapped program. Step-Saver completed its order with
the supplier over the telephone. The product was then mailed, along with a license disclaiming
all express and implied warranties. While the district court held in favor of The Software Link
44
on the grounds that the license agreement was part of the contract between the parties, the Third
Circuit, applying §2-207 of the UCC, reversed on the grounds that the license was in fact not
incorporated into the contract, since the sale had been completed before the user could learn of
35 Lemley, supra note 11, at 1248.
36 A full and modified version of UCITA has been adopted in Maryland and Virginia respectively. Iowa, North
Carolina, Vermont and West Virginia have explicitly rejected UCITA's reasoning, adopting 'bomb-shelter'
legislation which denies its applicability within the state.
37 See Spechtv. Netscape, 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
38 Kwang, supra note 13, at 356 (citing ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
39 Restatement (Second) of Contracts 17 (1988).
40 Einhorn, supra note 23, at 513-14.
41 Jennifer L. Hawkins, ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg: Enforceability of Shrinkwrap Licenses Under the Copyright Act,
3 RICH. J.L. TECH. 6 (1997), at http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/v3il /hawkins.html (accessed 5/21/2005).
42 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
4, 831 F. Supp. 759 (D. Ariz. 1993).
44 752 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. Pa. 1990).
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its terms.45 The decisive factor was that "the shrinkwrap licensing agreement was an insufficient
indication that [The Software Link] was willing to forego the transaction altogether unless Step-
Saver assented to the additional terms of the shrinkwrap license." The supplier's claim that the
telephone order constituted conditional, and not full, acceptance was therefore rejected.46 The
contract was concluded before the purchaser had an opportunity to review the license, and under
§2-207(2)(b), its (material) terms could not be included in the agreement.
Similarly, in Arizona Retail Systems, The Software Link found itself subject to a similar
breach of warranty lawsuit. The plaintiff had ordered a demonstration copy of a program and
consequently decided to order the complete version. The terms of the license were printed in full
on the outside of an envelope containing the program disk. The license contained common
restrictions, inter alia, that the user had obtained only a personal, non-transferable license to use
the program, a disclaimer for all warranties (other than physical defects in the disk), a limitation
of remedies to repair, a prohibition of assignment without the supplier's express consent, and a
provision claiming that breaking the seal of the package would constitute acceptance. 47 Arizona
Retail subsequently ordered successive, updated copies of the enhanced program. The court held
that the terms of the shrinkwrap were valid with regard to the first contract of purchase, but could
not be upheld in the subsequent contracts, on the grounds that the purchaser could not have read
the (presumably identical) license terms contained in the updates prior to the contract's
completion. Nonetheless, the first, 'full' purchase was deemed to constitute the sole opportunity
afforded to the buyer for review of the license terms.
It was not until the case of ProCD v. Zeidenberg48 that a court explicitly enforced a
shrinkwrap license applying to mass-marketed software. ProCD spent millions of dollars
developing a nationwide business and home phone directory of more than 95,000,000 names,
which it then sold as part of its 'Select PhoneTM' program. ProCD produced three different
versions of the program: one restricted for personal use, a second available at a higher cost and
aimed at commercial users, and a third available to users of America OnLine. All versions of the
program contained a shrink-wrap license limiting further use, with the cheaper, personal use
version containing the most prohibitions. Zeidenberg bought a copy of this version at a retailer's
outlet, and then purchased two further updates of Select Phone in March and April 1995. He
then merged the data with similar listings provided by another company, creating a new software
program to retrieve data from the hybrid database. He then launched the entire program as a
service accessible to Internet users through Zeidenberg's own company. ProCD filed an action
against Zeidenberg in Wisconsin's district court. Reversing the district court's decision, the
Seventh Circuit remanded with instructions to enter judgment in favor of ProCD. While Judge
Easterbrook accepted the lower court's finding that the database was not original and therefore
did not meet the standard set out in Feist v. Rural Telephone Service,49 he nonetheless found the
terms of the shrink-wrap license to be binding on Zeidenberg. The factors leading to Judge
45 "The additional terms are to be construed as proposals for addition to the contract. Between merchants such terms
become part of the contract unless ... (b) they materially alter it ..." U.C.C. §2-207(b) (1995).
46 Minassian, supra note 6, at 576.
47 831 F. Supp. at 761.
41 86 F.3d 1447 (7tf Cir. 1996).
49 499 US 340 (1991). In Feist the Supreme Court ruled that works based on compilations (such as a database),
must contain a minimum level of creativity to enjoy copyright protection. Thus a compilation is only
copyrightable if its facts are "selected, coordinated or arranged in such a way that the resulting work as a whole
constitutes an original work of authorship."
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Easterbrook's decision consider both general practices relating to the sale of commodities
alongside a detailed examination of the terms of the license itself.
Affirming the lower court's decision to treat the license according to the UCC, 50 the
court stated:
A vendor, as master of the offer, may invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose
limitation on the kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance. A buyer may accept by
performing the acts the vendor proposes to treat as acceptance. And that is what
happened. ProCD proposed a contract that a buyer would accept by using the software
after having an opportunity to read the license at leisure. This Zeidenberg did.
51
The court was heartened by the fact that such transactions - where the exchange of money
precedes the communication of additional detailed terms - were common in both online and
'traditional' transactions. The court also acquiesced to the impracticality of having the entire
license agreement printed on the outside of the box, and approved of the fact that ProCD's
license provided an express right of return should, following inspection, its terms be
unacceptable to the purchaser. 52 Furthermore, Zeidenberg received notice of the license on four
separate occasions prior to installing the program, and was repeatedly reminded of its existence
while actually using the software.
53
The basic message sent by the court was that the UCC allows contracts to be formed in
ways other than simply paying the purchase price of a product, and that, in fact, ProCD
proposed such a different method of acceptance. ProCD proposed a contract that the
buyer, after reading the license, could accept by using the software. The court found this
alternate method of contract creation to yield an enforceable contract, especially when, as
here, the purchaser accepts without protest.
54
The purported practical value of this 'basic message' notwithstanding, it is necessary to
consider if the decision in ProCD has stirred up issues of considerable doctrinal concern. The
common theme in shrinkwrap licensing is that the terms cannot be read until after the consumer
has completed the transaction. The fact that ProCD made a clear effort to draw the potential
user's attention to the existence of additional terms within the package prior to purchase appears
to have been sufficient for the case to be decided under §2-204 of the UCC rather than §2-207 or
§2-209. 55  It has been suggested elsewhere that, by focusing on the considerable cost of
producing the database incurred by the producer (albeit from otherwise non-copyrightable
50 "A contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by
both parties which recognizes the existence of such a contract." U.C.C. §2-204(1) (1995).
5' 86 F.3d at 1452.
52 Id. at 1451. "Vendors can put the entire terms of a contract on the outside of a box only by using microscopic
type, removing other information that buyers might find more useful (such as what the software does, and on
which computers it works) or both ... Notice on the outside, terms on the inside, and a right to return the
software for a refund if the terms are unacceptable (a right that the license expressly extends), may be a means
of doing business valuable to buyers and seller alike."
53 Robert W. Gomulkiewicz and Mary L. Williamson, A Brief Defense of Mass Market Software License
Agreements, 22 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 335, 367 (1996). Cited in Minassian, supra note 6, at 579.
54 Minassian, supra note 6, at 579.
5' Robert P. Merges, Peter S. Menell & Mark A. Lemley, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEw TECHNOLOGICAL
AGE 758-759 (3d ed. 1997). Note that §2-207 only applies between merchants, and could not apply in this case
involving a producer and an end user.
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sources), and recognizing the use of the software license to assist with ProCD's alleged intent to
engage in price discrimination, Judge Easterbrook may have given disproportionate weight to the
value of the license in ProCD's business model5 6 Accordingly, this reasoning has been subject
to widespread criticism. 57 Writing extra-judicially on the problem of poorly specified property
rights in cyberspace, Judge Easterbrook stated:
Well, then, what can we do? By and large nothing. If you don't know what is best, let
people make their own arrangements... Let us not struggle to match an imperfect legal
system to an evolving world that we understand poorly. Let us instead do what is
essential to permit the participants in this evolving world to make their own decisions.5 8
Judge Easterbrook's view overlooks the fact that, in the mass market, parties rarely 'make their
own arrangements:'
[T]he choices of where to allow price discrimination are deliberate. Thus, the copyright
statute fosters price discrimination between readers and replicators, but does not foster
price discrimination between those who buy a copy for reading pleasure and those who
buy a copy to mine it for ideas on which to base their own next production. One cannot
leap to the assumption that where some monopoly is a good idea, more price
discrimination is better. Moreover, and most fundamentally, price discrimination is at
best a mode of ameliorating a monopoly's effects. It is not a reason to approve a firm's
efforts to use contracts to acquire monopoly power over a market.5 9 (emphasis added)
With particular regard to the issue of price discrimination, this reasoning is, at best, over-
inclusive.
B. License or Sale? The Elusive Nature of the Software License
The 'fiction' that copies of software are licensed rather than sold has already been
discussed. Of the few lower court decisions going against the established practice of cases such
as Microsoft v. Harmony Computers & Electronics, two were reversed on appeal and two
vacated.6' Only one remains case good law, but it does not appear to have made a lasting
56 86 F.3d at 1449: "If ProCD had to recover all of its costs and make a profit by charging a single price - that is, if it
could not charge more to commercial users than to the general public - it would have to raise the price
substantially over $150. The ensuing reduction in sales would harm consumers who value the information at,
say, $200. They get consumer surplus of $50 under the current arrangement but would cease to buy if the price
rose substantially. If ... the only way to make a profit turned out to be a price attractive to commercial users
alone, then all consumers would lose out - and so would the commercial clients, who would have to pay more
for the listings because ProCD could not obtain any contribution toward costs from the consumer market."
57 Merges, Menell & Lemley, supra note 55, at 759 ("In fact, there was no evidence introduced in the case that
indicated ProCD would be willing to authorize a use such as Zeidenberg's at any price. The price
discrimination rationale is a construct based on Judge Easterbrook's assumption about what a rational actor
might do" (emphasis added)).
58 Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and The Law of The Horse, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207, 210 & 215-216 (1996).
59 Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination: Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L.
REv. 1367, 1390 (1998).
'o 846 F. Supp. at 210 (E.D.N.Y. 1994)
61 Raymond T. Nimmer, Copyright and Computer Technology, 1 No. 97 L. & COMPUTER TECH. 1, (2002), citing,
inter alia, DSC Communications Corp. v. Pulse Communications, Inc., 170 F.3d 1354, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1001 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (rejecting ruling of the District Court which purported to elevate the licensee of a single
payment license-in-perpetuity to the status of an owner) and Novell, Inc. v. Network Trade Center, Inc. 25 F.
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impression. 62 In addition, the court's persistent policy of considering license agreements as a
sale under the UCC leaves itself open to scrutiny.
The judiciary's stance is generally uncompromising, as evidenced by Adobe Systems v.
One Stop Micro.63 Here, the defendant distributor had improperly obtained copies of Adobe's
educational programs, which Adobe intended to sell at discounted prices. The distributor
proceeded to remove the original shrinkwrap license so as to conceal its origin, repackage the
software, and distribute it to be sold at the regular price. While One Stop Micro claimed that the
original shrinkwrap license was in fact a sales agreement and thus subject to the Doctrine of First
Sale, Adobe maintained its validity as a pure licensing arrangement. The court sided with Adobe
to declare the license valid. While the outcome of the case undoubtedly holds merit in terms of
public policy, the ease with which the court deferred to the terms of the end user license
agreement is hardly reassuring, particularly given the fact that the distributor was never a
signatory to the license.64 This approach has found further support in the Californian district
court. Ironically, following the ruling in ProCD, one derivation of this approach is to exempt
those who 'discover' software consisting of non-copyrightable material 'on the street' from the
terms of the license agreement. Under this derogation, One Stop Micro would presumably have
still been bound by the general law of copyright yet, in other cases, this suggests considerable
impetus for the rise of black markets.
66
The fiction of licensing also rests uneasily with the fact that the courts treat the license as
a 'good' for the purposes of the UCC. In most cases, the parties themselves agree to Article 2
governing the agreement. However, in iLAN Systems v. Netscout Services, the judge conceded
that the courts had "assumed, without deciding, that Article 2 governs software licenses," and
that although "the UCC best fulfils the parties' reasonable expectations" it was not its domain to
in fact do so. 6 7 Indeed, it is difficult to force the license within the framework of the UCC, under
which the good must be both "fit for [its] purpose"68 and of "merchantable quality."69 In most
cases the license is treated as a sale of a good by the parties and, consequently, by the judiciary.
Yet, it lacks one of the basic characteristics of such a sale: a transfer of ownership, and not
simply possession. Such a transfer is both a prerequisite under the UCC, and a notion that the
software lobby has gone to great pains to deny. Having already contracted around the provisions
of copyright law, why should vendors be allowed to toy with the UCC?
Supp. 2d 1218, 37 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d 528 (D. Utah 1997), 25 F. Supp. 2d 1233 (D. Utah 1998), vacated in
part, 187 F.R.D. 657 (D. Utah 1999); Novell, Inc. v. CPU Distribution., Inc., 200 WL 33672900 (S.D. Texas.
2000) (opinion vacated).
62 SoftMan Products v. Adobe Systems, 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
6, 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
64 Kwang, supra note 13, 359.
65Adobe Systems v. Stargate Software., 216 F. Supp. 2d 1051 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
66 Minassian, supra note 6, 597 ("If courts plan to allow software vendors to contract around the limitations of
copyright law, then competitors will try to avoid the contractual restrictions by acquiring works through illicit
markets. Competitors who acquire such works will be restricted by the copyright laws, but not by the contractual
restrictions").
61 183 F.Supp.2d 328 (2002).
68 UCC §2-315 (2004).69 UCC §2-314 (2004).
5 Chi.-Kent J. Intell. Prop. 21
Copyright © 2005, Chicago Kent Journal of Intellectual Property
While it may ultimately prove to only be an example of district court defiance, the recent
case of SoftMan Products v. Adobe Systems70 overturns both elements of the established case
law. Adobe sold a software 'bundle' at a reduced rate to the aggregated price of the individual
programs. SoftMan purchased the bundle, and then proceeded to strip down and sell its
constituent elements separately. As it had done in its previous action against One Stop Micro,
Adobe argued that SoftMan had violated the terms of its end user license agreement, maintaining
that the software hadnever been sold. SoftMan, predictably, pleaded the First Sale Doctrine.
The district court returned its verdict against Adobe, on the grounds that it had failed to
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the allegation of copyright infringement. 71 Despite the
existence of the license agreement, the court found that the transfer of the program mirrored that
of a sale rather than a license. Thus, the First Sale Doctrine was applicable. The court
concluded that the "business environment" facing Adobe, whereby its software would be
transferred to distributors, who pay the full value of the product and bear the risk of damage, loss
and inability to sell, ensured that such transactions could be interpreted only as a sale. 72 The
court also found that since SoftMan had no opportunity of review the license before the software
was unbundled, and therefore could not have expressly assented to its terms (SoftMan did not
actually load the software before distributing it), the license could be negated through simple
contract law. Overall, it was deemed "unnecessary to reach the question of the general validity
of shrinkwrap licenses at this stage because the Court has determined that SoftMan is not bound
by the [license agreement] because there was no assent to its terms." 73 However, the concern of
the court was clear: "Adobe seeks a vast and seemingly unlimited power to control prices and all
channels of distribution. "
74
The decision in SoftMan is by no means as far-reaching as it might have been.
Nonetheless, and provided it is not negated by a higher court, it does clarify that a license will
not bind an entity who has no opportunity to review its terms. Otherwise the position arising
from ProCD is maintained: "[s]hrinkwrap licenses are enforceable unless their terms are
objectionable on grounds applicable to contracts in general (for example, if they violate a
positive rule of law, or if they are unconscionable). 75
C. Software Licenses and Federal Preemption
Given the judicial tendency to uphold shrinkwrap licenses, academic attention may well
shift to focus on the extent to which they are compatible with federal copyright laws.
76
Examination of the Constitution shows that the Framers endowed Congress with the power to
70 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
71 Id. at 1094.
72 Id. at 1085. "The Court finds that the circumstances surrounding the transaction strongly suggests [sic] that the
transaction is in fact a sale rather than a license. For example, the purchaser commonly obtains a single copy of
the software, with documentation, for a single price, which the purchaser pays at the time of the transaction, and
which constitutes the entire payment for the 'license.' The license runs for an indefinite term without provisions
for renewal. In light of these indicia, many courts and commentators conclude that a 'shrinkwrap license"
transaction is a sale of goods rather than a license." (citing Stephen P. Tarolli, The Future of Information
Commerce under Contemporary Contract and Copyright Principles, 46 AM. U.L. REv. 1639, 1647-48 (1997)
and ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
73 Id at 1088.
74
[d at 1091.
71 86 F.3d at 1449.
76 Minassian, supra note 6, at 583.
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make copyright laws. 77 However, the Constitution is silent as to whether this exists to exclude
the right of the States to enact their own copyright laws. Today, copyright preemption may
occur in two areas: through statutory preemption and via the Supremacy Clause.
Statutory ('conflict') preemption occurs were the federal law supersedes the state statute
(or state-governed contract) which conflicts with the provisions of the Copyright Act.
78
Following the Supreme Court's 1973 decision in Goldstein v. California,79 it was held that while
the states did enjoy some powers to make copyright laws, "if a State attempted to protect that
which Congress intended to be free from restraint or free that which Congress had protected," 80
then that state law would be struck down. This principle was enshrined in section 301 of the
Copyright Act, and encourages the establishment of a uniform federal system of copyright
protection, and prevents states from extending greater protection than that prescribed in the
Copyright Act. 81 Section 301 is triggered when two conditions apply: first, the work in question
must be fixed in a "tangible medium of expression" within the "subject matter of copyright"; and
second, the asserted right under state law must be "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights
within the general scope of copyright., 8 2 Since the first element is discernible with regard to
section 106, the main issue with shrinkwrap licenses is whether the state law in question purports
to confer rights that are indeed 'equivalent' to those under the federal copyright regime.
83
Accordingly, in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,8 4 Louisiana's 1987 Software License
Enforcement Act was preempted on the grounds that the license in question purported to prohibit
a user from exercising the right to make an adapted copy of the program, as prescribed under
§ 117 of the Copyright Act.
'Delicate Balance' preemption may occur under the Supremacy Clause, where state laws
upset the balance struck by Congress. Generally the courts will save statutes from such
preemption if they possess an 'extra element' to differentiate them from failing the 'equivalency'
test in §301. In many cases the mere agreement of the parties is deemed sufficient evidence of
this requirement, although this has been carefully qualified by the courts. 85  In Bowers v.
Baystate Technologies,86 the defendant purchased copies of a patented computer aided design
program and, following a period of intense reverse engineering, introduced a modified version to
the market. While Bowers claimed breach of his shrinkwrap license agreement, Baystate
77 "The Congress shall have Power... [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries..." U.S.
Constitution, art. I, §8, cl.8.
7' Lemley, supra note 11, at 1272.
79 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
80 Id. at 559. Cited in Minassian, supra note 6, at 585.
8117 U.S.C. §301(a) (2000). "[a]ll legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within
the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and
103.. .are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent
right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State."
82 Id.
83 Minassian, supra note 6, at 584-586.
14 847 F.2d 255 (5tf Cir. 1988).
85 National Car Rental Systems v. Computer Associates International, 991 F.2d 426 (8 th Cir. 1993) (contract limiting
the operation of copyrighted computer program to certain uses (namely, 'in-house only') was not preempted by
federal law).
16 302 F.3d 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
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counter-claimed that the license was preempted by the Copyright Act. The Federal Circuit
concluded that such was not the case because the shrinkwrap license did contain the 'extra
element' required to distinguish the plaintiffs copyright infringement claim and the contractual
claim which made the scope of protection against reverse engineering under the shrinkwrap
license broader than under copyright law (Copyright Act?). In doing so, the court placed great
reliance on dicta from ProCD, which affirmed that where mutual assent and consideration are
clearly present in a contract, then the claim is qualitatively differentiated from claims of
infringement.
87
The decision in Bowers has been heavily criticized, in that the court's deference to
contract appears to subvert, rather than complement, the aims of the Copyright Act. By
attempting to reconcile Bowers in line with ProCD, the boundary between contract law and
federal copyright law has shifted further. The crux of the issue is that Bowers was able to use the
shrinkwrap license form to extend copyright protection to that which ordinarily would be
considered unprotectable and subject to fair use (through decompilation). 88  To maintain
consistency with ProCD, the court allowed Bowers' manipulation of the license (as a means of
avoiding price competition between himself and Baystate) to cloud its judgment in exactly the
same manner that ProCD's business model transfixed Judge Easterbrook. The effect is to
"judicially add a new right to the exclusive statutory rights of a copyright owner, an extra-
statutory power to control the use of unprotected informational content." 89 One might expect
innovators to push the law to the limit in protecting the original elements of their design - this
Bowers certainly did. However, one would hardly expect the judiciary to concur with a blatant
attempt to expand the scope of copyright laws far beyond that which Congress intended. Not
only might Bowers allow private individuals to take free of an express limitation on the
prohibition of reverse engineering, the decision also risks the encroachment of contract law into
the domain of the law of patents and trade secrets.
90
III. The 'Licensing Norm' Today
What is the impact of decisions such as ProCD, SoftMan and Bowers? At the very least,
these decisions can be said to have thrown the alleged general unenforceability of license
arrangements into question. Paradoxically, the cases may have set the law on a path to greater
long-term certainty, guiding the law towards the establishment of certain criteria and parameters
with regard to both the content of shrinkwrap licenses, and the manner in which content notice is
conveyed to the consumer. ProCD informs us that the court will look deeply into the facts and
circumstances of the case to discern any evidence of unconscionable behavior on the part of the
producer, and that the user must manifest assent to the terms of the agreement. SoftMan
demonstrates that a license cannot bind someone who has had no opportunity to review it. The
decision in Bowers hints towards an even more profound effect of the use of software licenses;
87 Id. at 1342.
88 David A. Rice, Copyright and Contract: Preemption After Bowers v. Baystate, 9 ROG. WILL. U. L. REv. 595, 622
(2004). Citing further, at 626-627, Atari Games v. Nintendo, 975 F.2d 832, 842 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("An author
cannot acquire patent-like protection by putting an idea, process or method of operation into an unintelligible
format and asserting copyright infringement against those who try to understand that idea, process, or method of
operation").
'9 Id. at 622.
90 Id. at 627.
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namely, that of the issue of the extent to which the 'licensing norm' truly constitutes a regime of
"information governance."
91
It would nonetheless be premature to suggest that ProCD has settled the law with regard
to shrinkwrap licensing today. At the same time, the practice of 'shrinkwrapping' is rapidly
giving way to 'browsewrap' and 'clickwrap' agreements. In the modern, consumer-driven world
that gave rise to the mass marketed license, users increasingly prefer to complete transactions for
software online, during which time their purchase can be downloaded from the producer's or
retailer's website. This eliminates much of the ambiguity surrounding the traditional shrinkwrap
license.92 In the wake of greater certainty with regard to issues of notice and consideration, the
courts should nonetheless be commended for resisting the temptation to validate the 'click' and
'browse' varieties of the software license solely on the grounds that, in purely objective terms,
each model should pose fewer doctrinal disputes. Specht v. Netscape93 aptly illustrates this
trend. The plaintiffs obtained 'SmartDownload' (a software 'plug-in' which enhances the
performance of the Netscape Communicator browser) from Netscape's website. The program
was subject to a clickwrap license containing numerous provisions, one of which purported to
limit disputes over the agreement to arbitrate proceedings in Santa Clara County, California. A
group of consumers sued Netscape and its parent company, America Online, on the grounds that
SmartDownload invaded their privacy by surreptitiously transmitting information to the
defendants each time the software was used. The defendants immediately moved to compel
arbitration, in accordance with the terms of the license. The plaintiffs contended that the license
was not enforceable because when the download page was accessed, all that was visible to the
user was a tinted 'Download' button which, when clicked, activated the downloading process.
The only reference to the license terms was through a hyperlink contained on the screen, yet the
link itself would only have been visible to the user if they had scrolled down the page. Further,
the existence of such terms was not brought to the user's attention while the software was
accessed or operated.94 Finally, the arbitration clause could only be accessed if the user, having
clicked the first hyperlink at the bottom of the download page, then clicked on one of several
links appearing in the subsequent screen.
To the court, these facts were sufficient to show that the plaintiffs simply "did not
manifest assent to... SmartDownload's terms." The court was unmoved by the defendant's
contention that a 'reasonably prudent offeree' would have learned of the existence of the license
prior to download. While a party could not ignore a contract simply by claiming that they had
not read it before signing, "[a]n exception to this general rule exists when the writing does not
appear to be a contract and the terms are not called to the attention of the recipient." Ultimately,
"a reference to the existence of license terms on a submerged screen is not sufficient to place
consumers on inquiry or constructive notice of its terms." 95 This latter point distinguishes the
case from ProCD, where the terms of the license 'splashed' onto the screen each time
Zeidenberg used the program. As such, it is hoped that Specht will further 'hone' the parameters
of acceptability with regard to the presentation and notice of software license agreements.
91 Madison, supra note 12, 275.
92 See Phillip Johnson, Comments, All Wrapped Up? A Review of the Enforceability of "Shrink-wrap" and "Click-
wrap" Licences in the United Kingdom and the United States, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REv. 98 (2003).
93 306 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2002).
94 Id., at 23.
9 Id, at 24-32.
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Conclusion: Reinforcing the 'Legal Fiction'?
If Specht has made a valuable step toward consolidating and clarifying the law relating to
software licenses, it has done so at the cost of reinforcing the fiction inherent in the vendor
lobby's insistence that while the transfer of the product is in fact a license, it is nonetheless
sufficiently analogous to the sale of a good that the UCC should govern disputes. Unless a
higher appellate court is prepared to go one step further than the court in SofiMan, and call into
question this practice, or an acceptable alternative to the UCITA can be found, then perhaps the
current delineation of rules within this dubious practice is the best we can hope for. Perhaps the
fact that 'the regime works' is all that really matters, and we should ignore the fictitious element
of modern industry practice on the grounds that imperfections are inevitable in such a rapidly
changing technological field. Echoing Judge Easterbrook: let the market decide what works best
for itself. I would be inclined to agree, were it not for the fact that the post-ProCD, post-Specht
world, while encouraging the 'visibility' of license terms, ultimately serves to underline the
helplessness of the consumer with regard to their ability to negotiate, question, or challenge the
terms to which they are being held. If I have no choice regarding the content of the agreement
on the screen before me, how I can benefit from knowing them in advance? Furthermore, if the
license is of such paramount importance to the vendor, then why are its terms not 'drilled home'
from the very moment a potential purchaser makes an enquiry about the product?
It has been suggested that a (partially) remedial move is not impossible. The UCITA,
which would treat a license as an actual sale by looking at the precise nature of the agreement,
96
has been referred to as a source of persuasive analysis in several recent cases, including Specht.
97
However, the entrenched nature of licensing in the marketplace, coupled with recent legislative
developments, ensure that this will be far from easy. Professor Madison has argued that the
established licensing practice for both open source (freeware) and closed source programs, along
with the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, constitutes a private regime of "information
governance" for the Internet - in fact, his argument goes so far as to suggest that licensing is
such an established practice that 'governance' is a mere byproduct of its existence. 98 This poses
a considerable risk to all forms of digital communication:
... there is the possibility that the licensing norm itself is internalized by the reader,
listener, and user communities such that the world of information production and
consumption is regulated informally, even in the absence of formal 'legal' enforcement
of particular licenses and of norms exogenous to the license itself.99
The mass marketing of software through licenses owes its existence to peculiarities in the
evolving computer industry in the midst of confusion surrounding the scope of copyright
protection afforded to computer programs. The licensing phenomenon rests in an uneasy balance
between state contract and federal copyright law and, while the case law discussed has provided
valuable information to software producers seeking to uphold their licensing agreements, the
ultimate effect is to reinforce the licensing norm within an ill-suited paradigm. The rise of
96 UCITA §502(a) (2000 Official Text)
97 Nimmer, supra note 61.
98 Madison, supra note 12, at 276.
99 Id. at 277.
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licensing as 'private governance' has eroded the scope of the Copyright Act; the remedy for
which can surely only be found through appropriate legislative action.
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